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1Board Structure and Corporate Risk Taking in the UK Financial Sector
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between board structure and corporate risk taking in the
UK financial sector. We show how the board size, board independence and combining the
role of CEO and chairperson in boards may affect corporate risk taking in financial firms.
Our sample is based on a panel dataset of all publicly listed firms in the UK financial sector,
which includes banks, insurance, real estate and financial services companies over a ten year
period (2003-2012). After controlling for the effects of endogeneity through the application
of the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator, the findings of this study
suggest that the presence of non-executive directors and powerful CEOs in corporate boards
reduces corporate risk taking practices in financial firms. The negative relationship can be
explained within the agency theory context, where managers are regarded as more risk averse
because of the reputational and employment risk. An increased power concentration is
therefore expected to enhance the risk aversion behaviour of directors. The findings however,
do not show any significant effect of board size on corporate risk taking in financial firms.
As this study covers recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code on the role of
corporate boards in managing firms’ risk, the empirical evidence could be useful for
corporate governance regulation and policy making.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Sector, Board Structure, Risk, Endogeneity
21. INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed several weaknesses in corporate
governance mechanisms in different countries. The crisis initially started in the financial
sector in the US, UK and other developed economies and led to substantial losses in financial
institutions worldwide in a few months’ time. In response to the severe effects of the crisis, in
2008, the US government interfered to insure more than $700 billion of the financial
institutions’ assets whereas the UK government announced a £500 billion rescue package
(Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012). The UK rescue package led the government to bail out many
high profile financial institutions, such as; Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, Alliance
and Leicester, HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland, among others (Akbar, Rehman, &
Ormrod, 2013). For instance, Northern Rock was initially supported by an emergency loan
from the Bank of England, and by February 2008 it had gone into state ownership (Hall
2008).
Internal corporate governance mechanisms are generally responsible for crafting and
implementing strategic decisions in most organisations. In the aftermath of the crisis, there
has been consensus in the literature with regards to the inadequate performance of the board
of directors which has been regarded as one of the main reasons for the crisis (e.g., Andres &
Vallelado, 2008; Boyd, Haynes, & Zona, 2011; Erkens et al., 2012; Hardwick, Adams, &
Zou, 2011; Ingley & van der Walt, 2008). The board of directors has also been blamed for not
protecting the shareholders’ rights and for focusing on the short term rather than the long-
term objectives of their organisations (Erkens et al., 2012). Improving the quality of risk
management mechanisms and disclosure by firms has therefore remained on the agendas of
regulators in different countries. Similarly, Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) document that
stakeholders’ and regulators’ efforts in relation to improving risk reporting and management
practices produced positive impact on the quality of risk disclosure and risk management in
their sample organisations.
As the capital structure of financial institutions is characterized by high leverage, their
executives are often motivated to take more risk (Smith & Jensen, 2000). Executives in the
financial sector were also accused of taking excessive risk which has been regarded as one of
the major causes of the financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Similarly, due to the asset
substitution effect, there is an increased tendency for excessive risk taking in highly
leveraged firms (Sepe, 2012). As the debt equity ratio increases, low-risk investments are
3substituted with high-risk ones which capture all the possible upside potential (Magnan &
Markarian, 2011; Sepe, 2012). High remuneration and incentives to managers also intensified
the risk taking attitude of executives which contributed to development of the recent financial
crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009).
Consequently, most corporate governance codes around the world emphasise on the
importance of the board of directors in managing the risk of firms. In the UK, the Corporate
Governance Code (2010) strongly focuses on board of directors and risk when describing
good corporate governance. Section (A.1) in the code states that “…the board’s role is to
provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and
effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed” (UK Corporate
Governance Code 2010, p. 9). In addition, more information on firms’ risk management
practices and their long-term horizon has also been added to the revised UK Corporate
Governance Code (2010). The revised code has given consideration to the long term horizon
and future success of firms as the main focus of the board of directors, and has mentioned the
term long term horizon of firms several times in its content.
Given the importance of the board of directors in firms’ operations, examining the
relationship between board structure1 and corporate risk taking is an important issue at the
present time. In particular, considering the immense importance of the financial sector in the
global economy, the relationship between board structure and corporate risk taking practices
in this sector requires a detailed investigation. Furthermore, the operating systems and the
way revenue is generated in this sector is different, due to which this sector is more exposed
to risk than other sectors. In addition, due to several unique characteristics of financial firms,
such as; different operating mechanisms (Macey & O'Hara, 2003); the presence of more
opaqueness and greater information asymmetry (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Caprio &
Levine, 2002) and, greater leverage (Nam, 2004), their corporate governance practices are
different from firms in the non-financial sector (see also, Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016).
Arun & Turner (2004) also indicate that the role of the board of directors is more complicated
and challenging in the financial sector.
1 In this study, board structure refers to board size, independence and CEO/chairperson duality. These variables
are considered the most debated in the corporate governance literature. See Adams et al. (2010) and Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003) for a full review.
4Financial institutions have deposits from people and other channels that together with
debtholders and shareholders are overseen by the board of directors (Macey & O'Hara, 2003;
Prowse, 1997). Thus, the involvement of more parties leads to more complex agency
problems than those which are normally observable in non-financial firms (Andres &
Vallelado 2008). Furthermore, Pathan (2009) argues that because of the important role that
financial institutions play in the stability of the economy, the board of directors as a control
governance mechanism is more important in the financial sector than the non-financial
sectors. It is also evident that due to the credit and financial relationships, failure of one
financial institution could lead to several failures in other institutions (Gordon & Muller
2011; Staikouras, Staikouras, & Agoraki, 2007). However, despite all this evidence, most of
the published research in this area is based on non-financial sectors with only a limited
number of papers covering the relationship between board structure and corporate risk taking
in financial firms.
This study therefore aims to examine the relationship between corporate board structure and
risk taking behaviour in UK financial institutions. In particular, we show how the board size,
board independence and combining the role of CEO and chairperson in boards may affect
corporate risk taking in financial firms. The focus on these three structural variables is
motivated by the mixed and inconclusive evidence on how these variables are related to the
corporate outcomes. In this regard, Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) argue that the
endogenous nature of the board structure variables leads to several problems in the estimation
methods which interfere in measuring the actual effect of governance practices. In particular,
board size and independence are the main variables that might be endogenously determined
in such relationships (Wintoki, Linck, Netter, 2012). We therefore control for all three types
of endogeneity in our study through the application of dynamic panel generalized method of
moments estimator. We also consider the important role of the risk committees with respect
to the decisions related to risk taking by the board of directors.
We contribute to the literature on board structure and firms’ risk management in three
different ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in the UK that
examines the relationship between board structure and corporate risk taking in the financial
sector. Despite the fact that the financial sector is heavily regulated, this sector was severely
hit by the recent financial crisis which led to substantial losses which also has long term
implications for other sectors. In the UK, a new regulatory framework for the financial sector
5was introduced on 1 April 2013. In addition, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) were introduced to work hand in hand with the Bank
of England to ensure the financial stability of financial institutions. In particular, the
Prudential Regulation Authority has introduced a new risk assessment framework, which
aims to protect financial institutions from failing. It is therefore likely that close and intense
government monitoring will moderate the role of the board of directors in determining
corporate risk taking.
Second, prior studies have extensively examined the relationship between board structure and
corporate performance (e.g., Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells,
1998; Guest, 2009; Yermack, 1996). However, with regards to corporate risk taking existing
evidence is very limited and mainly based on the US data (Cheng, 2008; Kim & Buchanan
2008; Pathan, 2009). We argue that due to institutional differences and several other
differences between the two countries the corporate risk taking behaviour of the board of
directors’ in the UK financial firms might differ from the US. Furthermore, although the
corporate governance structures are similar in both countries, the UK has been characterised
as weaker than the US in monitoring and disciplining of company directors. This can provide
company directors with opportunities to place their own interests over and above the interests
of shareholders that would result in higher agency costs in UK companies. We therefore
argue that these differences are important in exploring the role of board composition on
corporate risk taking in the UK.
Third, there is evidence in the existing literature which indicates that corporate board
structure is endogenously determined and that findings of most published studies are affected
by endogeneity (e.g., Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988, 1991, 1998, 2003). This study therefore
addresses the endogeneity issue by following Wintoki et al. (2012) and applies the dynamic
panel generalized method of moments estimator (system-GMM) as the method of estimation.
We argue that traditional estimation methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) or fixed
effects are unable to control the endogeneity problems whereas through the application of
system-GMM we control for three types of endogeneity i.e., unobserved heterogeneity,
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, and present more consistent results. In addition, we
test the robustness of our results by considering the effects of the presence of a risk
committee in corporate boards in the sample firms. This analysis is based on the assumption
that the presence of a risk committee on corporate boards would affect the risk taking
behaviour of financial firms.
6Using a panel dataset based on FTSE All-Share Index Financial Firms over a ten year period
2003-2012 (2760 firm year observations), this study finds the evidence suggesting that board
structure is associated with corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector. A negative and
significant relationship is found between the presence of independent non-executive directors
on boards and corporate risk taking behaviour. This finding is consistent with the monitoring
hypothesis; as limited availability of information to non-executive directors impedes effective
assessment of firms’ operations relevant for decision-making (Boone, Field, Karpoff, &
Raheja, 2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008; Raheja, 2005). We show that CEO power (i.e.,
combining the two positions of CEO and chairperson) lowers firm risk which is consistent
with the existing literature in this area (Kim and Buchanan, 2008; Pathan, 2009). This
negative relationship can be explained within the agency theory context, where managers are
regarded as more risk averse because of the reputational and employment risk (Amihud &
Lev, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, with more power
concentration, it is expected that it would increase the directors’ risk aversion behaviour. We
however, did not find any significant relationship between board size and corporate risk-
taking in financial firms. The results also show a significant relationship between the
presence of risk committees on boards and all the risk measures used in this study. This
finding specifies the important role of risk committees, and supports the regulation about the
inclusion of risk committees on the boards of financial firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss previous
literature and outline the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents details of the data collection
process, variable measurements and estimation methods. Section 4 provides details of the
empirical results and related discussions. Finally, section 5 concludes this paper by presenting
a summary of the overall findings, main contributions and implications of the study. This
section also acknowledges the research limitations and outlines avenues for future research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Under the framework of the agency relationships it has been argued that due to reputational
and employment risks managers are risk averse (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980).
However, managerial incentives, particularly those tied to corporate performance, might
encourage managers to take more risk (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen & Murphy,
1990). Hence, in order to align the interests of managers to those of shareholders different
incentives are offered to managers for increasing corporate value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
7In the financial sector, however, large monetary incentives led to the excessive managerial
risk taking, which has been recognised as one of the main causes of the 2007-2009 financial
crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Minton, Taillard, & Williamson, 2014; Pathan, 2009).
Several observers have therefore regarded that performance based incentives to executives of
financial institutions were much larger than those provided in the non-financial sector. This
was one of the reasons that could partially explain the excessive risk taking behaviour of
executives in the financial sector. In this context, a recent report by the OECD indicates that
these massive monetary incentives led the managers to focus on short-term as opposed to
long-term profits of their organisations (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Furthermore, while commenting
on the behaviour of executives in the financial institutions, Sepe (2012, p.346) argues, that
“….contrary to the conventional representation of managers as risk-averse agents, the
banking sector’s reliance on highly leveraged compensation schemes led managers to
undertake increasingly outsized bets-tail risk in the jargon of finance. When the market
turned sour, these reckless bets led to massive losses”.
In addition, due to the complexity of instruments used, opaqueness in the transactions and the
ability of managers to manipulate and adjust the risk structure, the financial sector is
characterised by greater information asymmetry. This would justify the government
intervention of placing tighter regulations in different countries for protecting the interests of
not only shareholders but also all other stakeholders (Arun & Turner 2004; Becht, Bolton, &
Röell, 2011; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011; Macey & O'Hara 2003). However,
there are both positive and negative consequences of the government interventions. Although,
it may serve as a governance mechanism that minimises the agency problems in the first
instance, it may also result in negative consequences, such as, moral hazard problems that
emerge from the deposit insurance system. As a result, shareholders will be less engaged in
monitoring activities, whilst managers will be encouraged to engage in more risky
investments (Nam, 2004; Staikouras et al., 2007). Furthermore, intense government
regulation weakens other external governance mechanisms such as, hostile takeovers,
competition etc. (Levine, 2004; Prowse, 1997).
While commenting on the implications of intense regulations, Prowse (1997) documents that
intense government regulations in the financial sector have made some of the hostile
takeovers costly which is one of the reasons of firms’ avoidance of those regulations.
Increased government regulations may also limit competition among financial institutions
8which would negatively affect economic stability. Similarly, restrictions on concentrated
ownership and identity of bank owners for instance, would also reduce competitiveness
(Levine, 2004). As a result, internal governance mechanisms such as board structure and
disciplining managerial behaviour might help in mitigating the agency problems in
organisations (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Staikouras et al., 2007). Consistent
with this argument, Pearce and Zahra (1992) report that the effectiveness of the board of
directors mainly depends on the corporate board structure of firms. Adams et al. (2010)
document that board size, independence and CEO power are of particular importance in
mitigating the agency problems in organisations. Similarly, Belghitar and Clark (2015) show
that monitoring mechanisms, such as board size and board composition play an effective role
in reducing agency costs in large firms. Likewise, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) argue that
by taking outside directors on their corporate boards European banks could enhance their
own risk disclosure mechanisms. We therefore discuss relevant literature on board structure,
size, independence, and CEO power below.
2.1 Board Size and Corporate Risk Taking
In line with the assumptions of the agency theory, the number of directors serving a corporate
board is relevant to the outcome of the board decisions. In addition, smaller boards are
generally viewed as more efficient and productive because there are less communication and
coordination problems (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). It has also been documented
in the literature that although increasing the number of directors on corporate boards may
offer more human capital, the cost may be higher than the benefit (De Andres, Azofra, &
Lopez, 2005). There is also empirical evidence in support of this argument which suggests
that firms with smaller boards have better corporate performance as compared to firms with
larger corporate boards (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996).
The effect of board size on corporate risk taking can also be explained from the perspective
of the agency theory. Jensen (1993), points out that due to communication and coordination
problems in larger boards, the decision-making process is time-consuming and slow. More
importantly, due to difficulties in reaching consensus in larger boards, decisions on extremely
important matters are usually not done in time. This implies that those firms which uses
larger board may experience less risk taking practices (Cheng, 2008). The negative effect of
larger boards on corporate risk taking is also supported in economics and social psychology
studies which assume that the decisions in large groups reflect all the heterogeneous opinions
9of its entire members and as a result, the final outcome is usually viewed as a group
compromise. In such circumstances, the situation generally results in the rejection of radical
decisions as they involve riskier projects (Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Moscovici & Zavalloni,
1969; Sah & Stiglitz, 1986; Sah & Stiglitz, 1991).
In the US, Cheng (2008), suggests that larger boards have a negative effect on three measures
of performance, namely monthly stock returns, annual accounting return on assets (ROA),
and Tobin’s Q. Similarly, evidence of a negative relationship between board size and
different firm characteristics is provided by Pathan (2009) and Wang (2012), which is
consistent with the US findings. Moreover, using a questionnaire survey as their research
instrument, McNulty et al. (2013) report a negative relationship between board size and
financial risk in their sample of UK firms which is also consistent with previous research
findings in this area. A negative relationship between board size and corporate risk taking is
therefore expected, which take us to our first hypothesis as follows.
H1: There is a negative relationship between board size and corporate risk taking in the UK
financial sector.
2.2. Board Independence and Corporate Risk Taking
In the existing literature, one proxy of board independence is the existence of independent
non-executive directors on corporate boards (Guest, 2010). Similarly, Jensen and Meckling
(1976) suggest that agency conflicts can be controlled and minimised by increasing the
number of non-executive directors on the boards. The presence of non-executive directors is
expected to be effective in monitoring as they are independent from management and would
be interested in protecting their own reputation in the labour market (Fama, 1980). Under the
reputation hypothesis, non-executive directors would support investments in less risky
projects which will help firms in avoiding losses and would thus protect the image of their
firms (Pathan, 2009). Also, on the basis of the monitoring hypothesis, it is assumed that the
presence of non-executive directors on corporate boards is expected to reduce corporate risk
taking. This hypothesis assumes that as a result of limited information available to firm’s
executives, the information asymmetry increases and as a result, the cost of information will
be higher for non-executive directors (Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008; Raheja, 2005).
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There is also empirical evidence that support the above arguments suggesting a negative
relationship between the presence of non-executive directors on boards and corporate risk
taking (e.g., Brick & Chidambaran, 2008). Similarly, Pathan (2009) while studying a sample
of 212 large US bank holding companies report a negative relationship between the
proportion of non-executive directors and total risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and
assets return risk. We therefore expect a negative relationship between board independence
and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector and form our second hypothesis as
follows.
H2: There is a negative relationship between board independence and corporate risk taking
in UK financial firms.
2.3 CEO/Chairperson Duality and Corporate Risk Taking
In the context of the agency relationships the separation of CEO and chairperson positions is
desirable because the dual role may have negative consequences on the monitoring function
of the corporate board which eventually might negatively impact firms’ shareholders (Jensen,
1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Moreover, Jensen (1993) argues that excessive power is
concentrated in the CEO when she/he is also the chair of the board of directors which
encourages self-interested managerial behaviour, impeding effective monitoring. However, it
has also been argued in other research papers that as a result of the managerial risk-aversion
attitude duality will lead to lower corporate risk taking (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Jensen &
Meckling 1976). In line with these assumptions, Kim and Buchanan (2008) analysed data of
the largest US firms for the year 2002 and found a negative effect of CEO/chairperson duality
on income stream risk, which was the main risk measure in their study and measured as the
standard deviation of return on assets. In addition, the findings of Pathan (2009) are
consistent with the view about the positive effects of duality on firms’ operations, suggesting
that CEO-Chairman duality reduces bank risk taking in the US. This leads us to our third
hypothesis as follows.
H3: There is a negative relationship between CEO/chairperson duality and corporate risk
taking in UK financial firms.
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3. DATA SAMPLE AND METHODOLGY
3.1 Data Sample
This study covers all UK public firms in the financial sector listed on FTSE All-Share Index
over a ten year period (2003-2012), and includes banks, insurance, real estate, and financial
services companies. The start of the period of analysis is inclusive of the 2003 revision of the
Combined Code of Corporate Governance which not only addresses most of the aspects from
the previous governance codes but also includes a change with respect to the board
independence of UK firms. The revised Combined Code required an increase in the
proportion of non-executive directors on boards from a third to at least half of the board size.
This indicates the importance and significance of the role of independent directors in the
corporate governance structures of UK companies. Since our focus is on all firms in the
financial sector, we do not use specific items related to the banks’ financial statements
(Erkens et al., 2012). In order to include a firm in the sample this study has applied three
different criteria. First, for the calculation of the corporate risk measure of individual firms,
this study requires all the sample firms to have at least 36 months of consecutive monthly
stock market returns data (Cheng, 2008; Florackis et al., 2011). Second, due to the estimation
method employed in this paper i.e., dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator,
it is required that financial data of the sample firms is available for at least five consecutive
years (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009). Third, we include all those firms for which governance data
was available from BoardEx database which is the main database available for UK
governance data. In addition, market and accounting data was extracted from Datastream and
Worldscope databases, respectively. Our final sample is therefore based on an unbalanced
panel containing 276 UK financial firms. Consistent with the majority of previously
published research studies in this area, winsorisation is applied to all the financial variables
where data points lie above 99% and lower than 1% percentiles (e.g., Shumway, 2001).
3.2 Variable Measurement
Dependent Variables
In order to investigate the effects of board structure on corporate risk taking in the UK
financial sector, this study uses different proxies for the risk measures. First, we take
idiosyncratic risk as the main proxy of corporate risk taking because it is highly likely that it
would be affected by the decisions of the board of the directors (Jin, 2002). We calculate
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idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residuals from the two-index market model.
This calculation is consistent with previous studies in this area (e.g., Pathan, 2009; Adams et
al., 2005). In mathematical form it is expressed as follows:
rit = αi+ β1iRmt + β2iInterestt + εit ………………………………………………………...…(1)
where, rit represents the monthly stock return2, Rmt denotes the monthly return on the FTSE All-
Share index, Interest is the 3-months’ risk-free rate and the εit stands for the residuals.
Second, we use an accounting based risk measure, Z-score as the proxy for measuring firms’
insolvency risk (Roy, 1952). Following previous published studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine
2009; Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010; Vyas, 2011) the Z-score is calculated according to the
following equation:
Z-score = [Average (ROA) + Average (CAR)]/σ(ROA) ……………….……………...…...(2) 
where ROA is the return on assets of the financial firms, CAR is the capital asset ratio
measured as the ratio of a financial firms’ capital and reserves to total assets, and σ (ROA) is 
the standard deviation of return on assets. It is generally expected that stable firms would
have a high Z-score and thus for making the explanations of the signs of coefficients similar
we use 1/Z-score as a proxy for the insolvency risk. If the inverse of Z-score is not used then
a high Z-score with high ROA would mean less insolvency risk (Pathan, 2009). For
estimating all the above values at least five consecutive years’ data is needed. Moreover, for
controlling the industry effects we have adjusted the Z-score measure by taking the difference
between a firm’s Z-score and the average Z-score of all firms in that industry in the same
year (Cheng, 2008).
The third risk measure we use in this study is the market adjusted idiosyncratic risk which is
calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the difference between the monthly
return of the FTSE All-Share Index and the monthly return of each of the sample firms.
2 Monthly stock returns are calculated by using the following equation: rit = RIit /RIit-1-1, where rit are the
monthly returns of stock i at month t, RIit is the return index for stock i in month t, and RIit-1 is the return index
for stock i in the previous month.
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Independent Variables
As highlighted above, the main governance variables of this study have been extracted from
the BoardEx database. First, following Cheng (2008) we measured board size as the natural
log of the total number of directors serving on a corporate board. Second, board
independence is measured as the number of non-executive directors divided by total number
of directors on the corporate board (Guest, 2009, 2010; Chen & Zhang, 2014). Third, CEO
power is measured through the use of a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO and
chairperson is the same person and zero otherwise (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Kim &
Buchanan, 2008).
Control Variables
This study uses several control variables in the empirical model. We control for firm size
because larger firms have the ability to diversify and are expected to encounter lower risk
than small firms (Konishi & Yasuda, 2004). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of
total assets of the sample firms. There is also evidence in prior literature which suggests that
firms with higher leverage are exposed to higher risk (Adams et al., 2005). We therefore
include financial leverage as a control variable in our model which is measured as the ratio of
total debt to total assets (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Furthermore, as suggested by Wiseman and
Gomez-Mejia (1998), it is highly likely that corporate performance would determine the
executives’ tendency toward corporate risk taking. Keeping this in mind, we control for firm
performance and include market-to-book ratio as a measure of corporate performance in our
model (Hagendorff & Vallascas, 2011). In addition, since older firms have more experience
and are expected to encounter lower risk, we also control for firm age in our analysis
(Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012). Other relevant evidence also suggests that providing
ownership incentive to managers would moderate their risk taking behaviour (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). We therefore control for CEO ownership in our model. We also include
risk committee as a control variable which according to the UK Corporate Governance Code
(2010) is a committee which contains independent directors and is responsible for monitoring
and reviewing a firm’s internal control and risk management practices. It is represented by a
dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has a risk committee and zero otherwise.
Details of variables names and their definitions, measurements and source are highlighted in
table 1 below.
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Table 1
Variable Definitions, Measurements and Sources
Risk Measures
Idiosyncratic Risk IDO
The standard deviation of the residuals from two index market model
using 60 monthly stock returns with a minimum of 36 months. Source:
Worldscope/Datastream
Market Adjusted
Idiosyncratic Risk Adj-IDO
The standard deviation of the residuals from the difference between
the monthly returns on the FTSE All-Share Index and the monthly
returns of each firm. Source: Worldscope/Datastream
Insolvency Risk Z-Risk 1/[average (return on assets)+average (capital assets ratio)]/σ   (return 
on assets ). Source: Worldscope/Datastream
Industry Adjusted Z-Risk Adj-Z-Risk
The difference between the firm’s Z-score and the average Z-score of
the firms in the same industry in the same year. Source:
Worldscope/Datastream
Board Structure Variables
Board Independence NED
Board independence is measured as the number of independent non-
executive directors divided by the total number of directors on the
corporate board. Source: BoardEx Database
Board Size BSIZE The natural log of total number of directors on corporate boards.
Source: BoardEx Database.
CEO/Chairperson duality DUL Dummy variable equal to (1) if the positions of CEO and chairpersonare combined, (0) otherwise. Source: BoardEx Database.
Control Variables
Financial Leverage LEV Total Debt /Total Assets. Item No. WC03255 and WC02999 extractedfrom Worldscope/Datastream Database.
Firm Size FSIZE Ln (Total Assets) Item No. WC02999 extracted from
Worldscope/Datastream.
Firm Age Age Number of years since incorporation. Item WC18273 extracted from
Worldscope/Datastream Database
Market to Book Value Ratio MTBV Market to book value of equity. Source: Worldscope/Datastream
Database
CEO Ownership CEOWN The percentage of shares owned by the CEO. Source: BoardExDatabase.
Risk Committee RC Risk committee contains independent directors and is represented by adummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has a risk committee
and zero otherwise. Source: BoardEx Database
Industry IN A dummy variable for each industry sector
Year Y A dummy variable for each year
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3.3 Research Methodology
In addition to other aims, one of the main objectives of this research is to control for
endogeneity in our empirical models. This is necessary because in a dynamic model, a lagged
dependent variable will be correlated with the firm fixed effects which will bias the OLS
estimators. Although, the influence of fixed effects can be eliminated with the application of
the fixed effects models, the transformation to eliminate the fixed effects will still present
correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error
term. Moreover, in the case of endogenous explanatory variables, it is expected that the error
term will be correlated with the explanatory variables, which is resulting in inconsistent fixed
effects and OLS estimators. A solution to overcome these econometric problems is the
application of a dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator (system-GMM)
which can also eliminate the fixed effects by a first-differences transformation and correcting
for the aforementioned bias (Arellano and Bond, 1991). It is therefore argued that in the
presence of endogeneity, the application of system-GMM is more appropriate than other
methods of estimation (such as, OLS or fixed effects estimators), where the resulting
estimators are regarded as biased and/or inconsistent.
We therefore follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and employ a dynamic panel system-GMM for
controlling all three types of endogeneity, i.e., simultaneity, unobservable heterogeneity, and
dynamic endogeneity. The first source stems from simultaneity, because corporate risk taking
and some of the financial variables are simultaneously determined (e.g., leverage). For
example, in order to avoid insolvency, firms’ leverage can be adjusted by managers which
would hide the actual level of risk faced by the firms.
The second endogeneity source comes from unobservable heterogeneity, where other omitted
variables could affect corporate risk taking but are unobservable, such as, the managers’
skills and ability. For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that when firms have
managers with high skills then fewer independent directors would be required because the
board monitoring function would be decreased.
The third source of endogeneity that may arise in our specification is dynamic endogeneity.
According to Wintoki et al. (2012), this type of endogeneity is usually ignored in most
governance studies which generally lead to mixed and inconsistent results. In general, Yit−1 is
endogenous to the fixed effects in the error term, which gives rise to dynamic panel bias.
When the current financial variables are affected by past corporate risk taking, a dynamic
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endogeneity would arise in the model specification. This positive correlation between a
regressor and the error term violates the assumption necessary for the consistency of OLS. In
particular, it increases the estimator for lagged corporate risk by attributing predictive power
to it, which actually belongs to the firm’s fixed effects.
Through the application of system-GMM, we are able to control for all the three sources of
endogeneity and argue that our estimations are yielding consistent results. The system-GMM
estimation that is applied in our analyses transforms all regressors by differencing, then based
on the additional assumption that first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated
with the fixed effects it includes more instruments that aim to improve the efficiency. In other
words, it builds a system of two equations, one in levels and one in differences and combines
moment conditions for each, where instruments of the endogenous variables are lags in
differences and levels, respectively (Roodman, 2006).
This method relies on lags of the dependent and explanatory variables which are used as
instruments. We include lags of corporate risk measures (dependent variable) to capture the
dynamic effect of past risk taking on current corporate risk of board structure and a firm’s
financial characteristics.3
Following Wintoki et al. (2012), we assume that all the board structure variables and all the
firm financial characteristics are endogenous except firm age and year dummies. We use the
following model to examine the effect of current board structure on corporate risk taking:
      =     +               +               + ∑                     +                     +         +     +       …………. (3)
where,       is the dependent variable either Z-risk or idiosyncratic risk,           ,           are the first
and second lags of the dependent variable. In case of Z-risk as the dependent variable, we
include the first and second lags in our analysis, whereas in case of idiosyncratic risk as the
dependent variable only the first lag is used in our analysis.           , represents, board size,
board independence and CEO/chair duality.                   , represents the control variables
3 To determine how many lags should be included in the model, we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and regress
each current risk measure on three lags of past risk in addition to the firm characteristics that were used as
control variables. For idiosyncratic risk, only the first lag is significant, which means including one lag of
idiosyncratic risk will ensure that the past effect is captured. For the idiosyncratic risk, lag two and older can be
used as instruments in the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator (system-GMM). However,
when the dependent variable is Z-risk the first and the second lags are significant, which implies that including
two lags for Z-risk will be sufficient to capture all the dynamic effect estimated by system-GMM. Furthermore,
lag three and beyond would be exogenous and could be used as instruments.
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namely, leverage (LEV), firm size (FSIZE), firm age (AGE), market to book ratio (MTBV),
and CEO ownership (CEOWN). In addition,       represents the exogenous variables which
include firm age and year dummies, μi denotes unobserved firm effect and εit stands for the
residuals.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables
used in the empirical analysis. The average Z-score (Idiosyncratic Risk) in the UK financial
institutions is 0.12 (0.05), the average board size is around 7 directors, whereas the proportion
of non-executives on boards is about 70%. In addition, the CEO/Chairperson duality
percentage shows a high level of compliance in separating the CEO position from the
chairperson where only 5.3% of the sample firms are combining the two positions. In
addition, our control variables have a mean (standard deviation) of; CEO ownership
0.02(0.06), firm size 13.32(2.01), financial leverage 0.13(0.17), market to book 0.95(0.66),
and firm age 38.66 (37.80) years. These figures are consistent with some recently published
UK studies in this area of research (e.g., Ozkan, 2007; Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; McNulty et
al., 2013).
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
IDO 0.054 0.027 0.005 0.019 0.311
Z-Risk 0.1211 0.1430 0.010 0.078 0.851
BSIZE 7.268 2.977 2.000 6.000 22.000
NED 0.695 0.227 0.000 0.775 1.000
DUL 0.053 0.113 0.000 0.000 1.000
CEOWN 0.017 0.061 0.000 0.090 1.362
FSIZE 13.318 2.010 10.036 12.885 20.641
LEV 0.125 0.173 0.000 0.047 0.721
MTBV 0.954 0.665 -2.813 0.931 2.217
Age 38.660 37.804 2.000 20.000 139.000
Notes: Table 2 presents descriptive statistics among the variables of this study, where, (IDO) is idiosyncratic risk, (Z-risk) is
insolvency risk, (BSIZE) is board size, (NED) is non-executive directors, and (DUL) is CEO/Chairperson duality. Control
variables include CEO ownership (CEOWN), firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), growth opportunity (MTBV), and firm age
(AGE).
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Table 3 presents the correlation matrix among the variables of this study. According to
Gujarati (2003), high collinearity among variables may cause econometric problems in those
situations where the correlation between the variables is 0.80 or higher. As evident in table 3
none of the values are high enough to cause any potential collinearity problems and it is
therefore unlikely to influence our results.
TABLE 3
Correlation Matrix
Z-Risk IDO BSIZE NED DUL AGE LEV FSIZE MTBV CEOWN
Z-Risk 1.000
IDO 0.534 1.000
BSIZE 0.181 0.138 1.000
NED -0.344 -0.280 -0.517 1.000
DUL 0.046 0.033 0.033 -0.128 1.000
AGE -0.230 -0.160 -0.146 0.139 0.038 1.000
LEV 0.243 0.183 0.124 -0.279 0.036 0.068 1.000
FSIZE 0.089 0.073 0.602 -0.272 0.011 0.003 0.142 1.000
MTBV 0.094 0.022 0.320 -0.313 0.054 -0.164 -0.101 0.139 1.000
CEOWN 0.233 0.227 0.065 -0.143 0.148 -0.044 0.088 0.004 0.217 1.000
Notes: Table 3 presents correlation matrix among the variables of this study, where, Z-Risk is insolvency risk, (IDO) is
idiosyncratic risk, (BSIZE) is board size, (NED) is non-executive directors, and (DUL) is CEO/Chairperson duality. Control
variables include firm age (AGE), leverage (LEV), firm size (FSIZE), growth opportunity (MTBV), and CEO ownership
(CEOWN).
Table 4 provides the evolution of UK board structure over the 10 years sample period (2003-
2012). The noticeable increase in the proportion of non-executive directors implies the
compliance of UK financial institutions with the recent corporate governance
recommendations. The figures also indicate that the majority of the sample firms move
towards the non-duality of CEO and chairperson on their boards. Table 4 also describes that
on average there are 7 directors serving on the financial institutions’ boards whereas the
reported figures also indicate a decrease in board size from 9.5 in 2003 to 6.6 in 2012.
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TABLE 4
Evolution of UK Board Structure
Mean (Standard Deviation)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 All Years
NED 0.57 0.62 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.80
(0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.23)
DUL 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
BSIZE 9.50 9.02 7.80 7.25 7.13 6.93 6.77 6.84 6.88 6.61 7.27
(3.20) (3.16) (3.17) (3.09) (2.93) (2.76) (2.63) (2.71) (2.82) (2.58) (2.98)
Notes: Table 4 reports the mean and (standard deviation) for the percentage of non-executive directors (NED),
CEO/Chairperson duality (DUL), and board size (BSIZE) over the sample period.
Table 5 (Panel A) shows that the average number of directors on banks’ boards is 14.39. This
is larger in comparison to other sub-sectors. However, financial firms are more complex and
larger in size where the bigger board is generally expected. In addition, there is evidence in
the existing literature which suggests a positive relationship between board size and
complexity of the firms (Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008; Raheja, 2005). A noticeable
statistics in Table 5 shows that even though financial services has the smallest board size
containing around six directors, the majority of those directors are independent with an
average figure of around 76%, which is the highest in the whole of financial subsectors.
Financial services firms also have the lowest CEO/Chairperson duality percentage, which
means that the majority of these firms separate the two roles.
Similarly, figures in Table 5 (Panel B) indicate that larger firms have larger boards where the
mean differences are statistically significant at the 1% level (p<0.01). This is consistent with
prior published studies in this area of research, which suggest that firms’ complexity would
require more directors on their corporate boards (see e.g., Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al.,
2008). Furthermore, small firms in the financial sector are keeping more non-executive
directors on their boards whereas the average CEO/Chairperson duality position is higher in
large firms.
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TABLE 5
Industry Classification and Means Differences for the Board Structure Variables
Panel A
Industry BSIZE NED DUL
Banks 14.39(2.96)
68%
(9%)
0.7%
(0.20%)
Insurance Firms 10.05(2.52)
62%
(11%)
4.0%
(20%)
Financial Service
Firms
6.33
(2.37)
76%
(21%)
0.6%
(8%)
Real Estate Firms 7.77(2.28)
65%
(20%)
2.0%
(14%)
Panel B
Large firms Small firms t-statistics
BSIZE 8.722 5.650 (25.33)***
NED 0.728 0.862 (-11.94)***
DUL 0.014 0.004 (2.0036)**
Notes: Table 5, Panel A reports the mean (standard deviation) for board size (BSIZE), non-executive directors
(NED) and CEO/Chairperson duality (DUL) for each industry. Panel B shows, the mean differences of board
size (BSIZE), non-executive directors (NED), and CEO/Chairperson duality (DUL) between large and small
firms. Firms are sorted according to the market value: firms above the median of market value are classified as
large firms whereas those below the median are classified as small firms.
Table 6 reports the results from the estimation of our model. The findings indicate that board
size is insignificant under all risk measures. Accordingly, we reject H1 which describes a
negative relationship between board size and corporate risk taking, which may be attributed
to the number of directors on boards of the financial institutions. In our sample, the average
board size for banks, insurance companies, real estate, and financial services companies is
14.39, 10.5, 7.74 and 6.3, respectively. In this regard, evidence in the existing literature
suggests that when board size exceeds seven directors then due to communication and
coordination problems in larger boards it usually becomes ineffective (Jensen 1993). Our
finding regarding board size is consistent with that of previously published studies in other
countries (see e.g., Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012, in the US). The insignificant effect is
also consistent with Tao and Hutchinson (2013) who examine the Australian financial sector
and report insignificant relationship between board size and corporate risk taking in
Australia.
With respect to UK studies, this insignificant effect is inconsistent with McNulty et al. (2013)
and Gonzalez and André (2014). While McNulty et al. (2013) report a negative relationship
between board size and corporate risk taking in the UK largest non-financial companies,
Gonzalez and André (2014) show a positive association between board size and corporate
risk taking in the UK. The contrasting results may be due the endogeneity issues because
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these two studies have not accounted for of all the three forms of endogeneity in their
analysis.
Table 6 indicates a negative relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors
on the board under all risk measures which provide support for our hypothesis H2 which
states a negative relationship between board independence and corporate risk taking. The
negative effect of non-executive directors on risk taking is consistent with the reputation
hypothesis, suggesting that NEDs are concerned about their reputation (Fama, 1980; Fama &
Jensen, 1983). As a result, selecting less risky investments might be approved for avoiding
exposing the firm to higher risk that in turn might increase the likelihood of insolvency.
Another explanation for the negative effect of board independence on risk taking might be
related to (i) the compliance of directors with government regulations (Pathan, 2009); and,
(ii) the restricted monitoring of non-executive directors when information is limited (Boone
et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Raheja, 2005). These results are consistent with the findings
of prior empirical research papers in this area of research (Brick & Chidambaran, 2008;
Gonzalez & André, 2014; Pathan, 2009).
The effect of CEO power is also negative and significant under all risk measures. These
findings reveal that combining the position of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces
firm’s risk. This negative effect leads us to support H3 which states a negative relationship
between CEO/Chairperson duality and corporate risk taking. Furthermore, the negative
relationship provides support to the agency theory assumptions where managers are assumed
to be more risk averse due to reputation and employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This finding is consistent with Kim and
Buchanan (2008) and Pathan (2009), who studied the US market in their research projects.
In addition, it is also well documented in the existing literature that taking more debt leads to
higher risk (e.g., Erkens et al., 2012; Nakano & Nguyen, 2012). Our results are therefore
consistent with previous literature on the relationship between high leverage and risk.
Similarly, older firms have less performance variability and can thus avoid risk (Adams et al.,
2005; Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012). With respect to firms’ age and the ratio of market to
book value we find a negative and significant estimator for all risk measures. This is also
consistent with previously published studies in this area of research (e.g., Hagendorff and
Vallascas, 2011). Table 6 also indicates that lags of risk measures are significant which
justify their inclusions in our model specification. Moreover, the specification tests confirm
validity of the application of system-GMM in this research, which show the robustness of our
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model estimators. In this regard, Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that serial correlation might exist
in the first differences AR (1), but there should be no serial correlation in the second
differences AR (2). In light of this, our results indicate no serial correlation in the second
differences. Furthermore, the results of Hansen test of over-identification support that the
instruments we used in this study are valid. The last test is differences in Hansen test of over-
identification, which indicates the exogeneity of the instruments used in level equations. The
p-values for this test pass and thus suggest that the instruments we used in this study are
exogenous.4
TABLE 6
The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Risk Taking
Dependent variable (1)Z-RISK
(2)
IDO Risk
(3)
Adj-Z-Risk
(4)
Adj- IDO
Ln(BSize) 0.001 -0.000 -0.006 0.018
(0.835) (0.996) (0.654) (0.208)
NED -0.010* -0.083*** -0.093*** -0.090***
(0.081) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006)
DUL -0.061** -0.030** -0.043** -0.055***
(0.041) (0.016) (0.042) (0.006)
LEV 0 .017* 0 .014 0 .014** 0.020*
(0.052) (0.595) (0.035) (0.090)
Age -0.000*** -0.000** -0.070*** -0.007**
(0.009) (0.022) (0.001) (0.035)
MTBV -0.006*** -0.015** -0.086** -0.013**
(0.007) (0.040) (0.020) (0.023)
CEOWN 0.006 0.060 0.124 0.172**
(0.466) (0.471) (0.312) (0.023)
FSize 0.000 -0.002 -0.054 -0.005
(0.651) (0.358) (0.721) (0.147)
Risk(t-1) 1.203*** 0.274*** 0.288*** 0.141***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk(t-2) -0.332*** -0.245***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.016 0.115*** 0.091 0.034**
(0.128) (0.006) (0.126) (0.015)
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.335 0.455 0.455 0.563
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.130 0.227 0.227 0.368
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value) 0.438 0.268 0.268 0.299
Notes: Table 6 presents results of the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator using Z- risk,
industry adjusted Z-risk, idiosyncratic risk, and market adjusted idiosyncratic risk, as proxies for corporate risk.
P-values are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. ***; **; * represent
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first-order and second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of
over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the
null that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. See table 1 for variables definitions and
measurements.
4 As a comparative analysis, we repeated all our analysis by using a sample of UK non-financial firms. The
results for the sample of our non-financial companies are largely similar to those of the financial sector. For
reason of space, results of the non-financial firms are not reported in the paper. These results are however,
available from the authors upon request.
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4.1 Controlling for the Risk Committee
In order to test the robustness of our results we replicated all the above regressions, where we
also controlled for the existence of a risk committee on corporate boards. Including risk
committee as a control variable stems from the important role of this committee with respect
to the decisions related to risk taking by the board of directors (Klein, 2002). We include a
dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has a risk committee and zero otherwise.
The information on risk committee was directly extracted from the BoardEx database.
Table 7 reports the findings which indicate that the results on board structure variables
remained similar. One noticeable finding in these analyses is that the coefficient on risk
committee is positive and significant for all risk measures. There could be two plausible
explanations for these findings. First, the existence of a risk committee is likely to improve
the effectiveness of firms because risk committees play an important oversight role that
reduces the conflict of interest between managers and the shareholders. As a result, managers
are expected to start acting in the interest of shareholders. This, in turn, induces the managers
to be less risk-averse and take on more risk in order to increase shareholders’ wealth.
Second, as risk committees contain experts in the field, the corresponding firm would
understand the benefits of risk taking from a strategic point of view. Those organisations will
therefore fully understand the key risks and related business objectives and would be willing
to take the necessary risk (rather than excessive risk) in line with their financial strategy. We
therefore believe that due to these characteristics, a positive association is observed between
risk committee and all risk measures in this study. These findings thus specify the significant
role of risk committees on the corporate boards of financial firms and support the regulation
about the existence of risk committees in financial institutions.
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TABLE 7
The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Risk Measures including Risk Committee
Dependent variable Z-RISK IDO Risk Adj-Z-Risk Adj- IDO
Ln(BSize) 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.019
(0.761) (0.923) (0.563) (0.411)
NED -0.012* -0.079*** -0.071*** -0.120***
(0.091) (0.000) (0.005) (0.009)
DUL -0.072** -0.028** -0.027** -0.021***
(0.031) (0.021) (0.030) (0.001)
LEV 0 .019* 0.023 0 .017** 0.007*
(0.051) (0.239) (0.033) (0.008)
Age -0.006*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.021) (0.001) (0.035)
MTBV -0.008*** -0.015** -0.088** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.046) (0.030) (0.023)
CEOWN 0.007 0.042 0.125 0.052**
(0.342) (0.629) (0.312) (0.023)
FSize 0.000 -0.004 -0.054 -0.002
(0.761) (0.149) (0.725) (0.122)
RC 0.021* 0.017** 0.034* 0.042**
(0.098) (0.016) (0.074) (0.022)
Risk(t-1) 1.205*** 0.274 *** 0.281*** 0.141***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk(t-2) -0.330*** -0.242***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.018 0.120** 0.051 0.036**
(0.129) (0.023) (0.226) (0.015)
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.336 0.356 0.461 0.477
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.127 0.281 0.291 0.287
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value) 0.389 0.311 0.293 0.233
Notes: Table 7 presents the results of the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator using Z- risk,
industry adjusted Z-risk, idiosyncratic risk, and market adjusted idiosyncratic risk as proxies for corporate risk
after including risk committee (RC) in the model. P-values are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based
on robust standard errors. ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. AR (1)
and AR (2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under
the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid.
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are
exogenous. See table 1 for variables definitions and measurements.
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The board of directors is considered to be the main internal governance mechanism in
modern corporations. This study examines the link between board structure and corporate
risk taking in the UK financial sector. It is important to note that most of the previously
published studies in this area use only banks in their sample (see for example, Pathan, 2009),
however, for conducting more robust analyses we include all financial institutions in our
sample. The outcome of our analyses shows board structure as an important determinant of
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idiosyncratic risk. Our findings also indicate that more independent boards would take less
corporate risk which is consistent with the reputation and monitoring hypotheses (Fama,
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Raheja, 2005). The results further indicate that combining the
positions of CEO and chairperson of the board has a negative effect on corporate risk taking
(Kim & Buchanan 2008; Pathan 2009). However, no significant effect of the board size on
corporate risk taking was found in the UK financial firms.
The findings of this study thus offer the theoretical rationale of how the board size,
independence and CEO/chairperson duality could determine corporate risk taking in the UK
financial sector. We argue that due to the importance of risk taking and risk management by
financial firms, this study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, the
recent financial crisis originated from the financial sector which resulted in the collapse of
several financial institutions. Due to the significant role of the financial sector and the
multinational operations of large financial institutions, the crisis had severely affected all
industrial sectors worldwide. Investigating the role of board structure in corporate risk taking
in the financial sector is therefore a timely and worthwhile contribution to the existing
literature. Second, we not only consider all firms in the financial sector but also give due
consideration to the endogeneity problem in our empirical analyses through the use and
application of the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator (system-GMM),
and argue that our results are robust to the endogeneity issues. Third, the inclusion of risk
committee in our analysis provides further insights into the oversight role of this committee
in financial institutions.
On the issue of corporate governance regulation and firms’ risk taking this study has several
important implications in the UK and other countries. As this study covers recommendations
of the UK corporate governance code (2010) on the role of corporate boards in managing
firms’ risk, the findings of this study would be relevant to regulatory bodies in their work in
establishing and further improving future corporate governance regulations. We argue that in
the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and the subsequent calls for strengthening the
corporate governance mechanisms of financial firms, provision of evidence on the effects of
board composition on corporate risk taking in financial firms is an important contribution for
the regulators in different countries. These findings will thus help in strengthening future
corporate governance regulations not only in the UK but also in other countries and will be
useful in safeguarding against any such events in the future.
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Our findings in relation to the number of directors on boards, proportion of independent non-
executive directors on boards, CEO/chairperson duality, and existence of a risk committee in
corporate boards provide useful insights into bolstering corporate governance structures. In
addition, by taking all sub-sectors of the financial sector in our sample we argue that our
analysis covers the whole of the financial sector and has implications for not only banks but
also all other financial institutions. Considering the role and functions of the financial system,
it is evident that financial firms not only provide financial services to the consumers,
financial, non-financial, and public sector organisations, but also to the whole of the world
economy, and thus play a significant role in our society. We therefore argue that the evidence
presented in this research on the governance structure of financial firms, the implications of
this study are not only relevant to financial firms and the financial system but also to
consumers, organisations in all sectors, and the global economy as a whole.
The findings of this research support the assertion that concentration of powers in
CEO/chairperson leads to opportunistic managerial behaviour resulting in increasing the risk-
averse behaviour of managers. The separation of CEO and chairperson roles could therefore
ensure that interests of managers are aligned with those of the shareholders in inducing
managers to take actions that would result in maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Similarly, our
results also favour the inclusion of a risk committee in the board structures as it appears to
reduce the risk-aversion behaviour of managers. Finally, in terms of research methods,
controlling for the effects of endogeneity is regarded as a very important factor in corporate
governance research in recent years. In relation to this, the findings of this study provide
support for the application of system-GMM in future corporate governance studies.
Despite its contributions this study has limitations. First, it covers the role of board size,
board independence and CEO and chairperson duality in managing risk in financial firms.
The study also controls for the existence of a risk committee in corporate boards in the
sample firms. However, other board characteristics, such as, directors’ educational level,
ethnicity, key shareholdings in other companies, and owners’ identity, are not covered in this
investigation. Future studies could extend our analyses by including these and other personal
characteristics of directors to provide additional useful insights to this line of literature.
Second, extending the sample period to two or three decades would have provided further
strengths to the findings and future corporate governance regulations. Finally, we have
adopted quantitative research methods in this research; however, examining the perceptions
of financial firms’ managers and directors through the application of qualitative methods
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could provide interesting and in-depth insights to our understanding of the link between
internal corporate governance mechanism and risk taking in financial firms. All these
avenues are therefore left to future research.
28
References
Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira. D. (2005). Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on
Corporate Performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18(4),1403-1432.
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The Role of Boards of Directors
in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey. Journal of
Economic Literature, 48 (1), 58-107.
Akbar, S., Rehman, S., & Ormrod, P. (2013). The impact of recent financial shocks on the
financing and investment policies of UK private firms. International Review of
Financial Analysis, 26, 59-70.
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981). Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate
Mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 605-617.
Andres, P. de., & Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the
board of directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(12), 2570-2580.
Arellano, M. & Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic
Studies, 58(2), pp. 277-297.
Arun, T. G., & Turner, J. D. (2004). Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing
Economies: concepts and issues. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
12(3), 371-377.
Barakat, A. & Hussainey, K. (2013). Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk
reporting: Evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks.
International Review of Financial Analysis, 30, 254-273.
Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson. R. E (1990). The Composition of Boards of Directors and
Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy. Academy of Management Review,
15(1), 72-87.
Belghitar, Y., & Clark, E. (2015). Managerial risk incentives and investment related agency
costs. International Review of Financial Analysis, 38, 191-197.
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2011). Why bank governance is different. Oxford Review
of Economic Policy, 27 (3), 437-463.
Boone, A. L., Field, L. C., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007). The determinants of
corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial
Economics, 85 (1), 66-101.
Boyd, B. K., Haynes, K. T., & Zona, F. (2011). Dimensions of CEO–Board Relations.
Journal of Management Studies, 48 (8),1892-1923.
Brick, I. E., & Chidambaran, N. (2008). Board monitoring, firm risk, and external regulation.
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 33(1), 87-116.
Caprio, G. Jr., & Levine, R. (2002).Corporate governance in finance: Concepts and
international observations. Financial Sector Governance: The Roles of the Public and
Private Sectors, Eds. R. E. Litan, M. Pomerleano, and V. Sundararajan, Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 17-50.
Chen, J.J. & Zhang. H. (2014). The impact of the corporate governance code on earnings
management. European Financial Management, 20(3): 596-632.
Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of
Financial Economics, 87 (1), 157-176.
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of
Financial Economics, 87 (2), 329-356.
De Andres, P., Azofra, V. & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate Boards in OECD Countries: size,
composition, functioning and effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 13 (2), 197-210.
29
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985). The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155-1177.
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm
value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48 (1), 35-54.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74.
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., & Matos, P. P. (2012). Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008
Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 18 (2), 389-411.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political
Economy, 88(2), 288-307.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law
and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
Florackis, C., Kostakis, A., & Gregoriou, A. (2011). Trading frequency and asset pricing on
the London Stock Exchange: Evidence from a new price impact ratio. Journal of
Banking and Finance, 35(12), 3335-3350.
Florackis, C., & Ozkan, A. (2009). The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency
Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data. European Financial
Management, 15(3), 497-528.
Gonzalez, A., & André, P. (2014). Board Effectiveness and Short Termism. Journal of
Business Finance & Accounting, 41(1-2), 185-209.
Gordon, J. N., & Muller, C. (2011). Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund. Yale Journal on Regulation, 28,
151.
Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., & Xu, P. (2011). Corporate Governance and
Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial
Banks. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(5), 418-436.
Guest, P. M. (2009). The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK.
The European Journal of Finance, 15(4), 385-404.
Guest, P. M. (2010). Board structure and executive pay: evidence from the UK. Cambridge
Journal of Economics, 34(6), 1075-1096.
Gujarati, D.N. (2003). Basic Econometrics: New York: McGraw-Hill, United States of
America.
Hagendorff, J., & Vallascas, F. (2011). CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from
bank acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1078-1095.
Hall, M. J. B. (2008). The sub‐prime crisis, the credit squeeze and Northern Rock: the lessons
to be learned. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 16(1), 19-34.
Hardwick, P., Adams, M., & Zou, H. (2011). Board Characteristics and Profit Efficiency in
the United Kingdom Life Insurance Industry. Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, 38(7-8), 987-1015.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The Determinants of Board Composition. The
RAND Journal of Economics, 19(4), 589-606.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The Effects of Board Composition and Direct
Incentives on Firm Performance. FM: The Journal of the Financial Management
Association, 20(4), 101-112.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and
Their Monitoring of the CEO. The American Economic Review, 88 (1), 96-118.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of Directors As an Endogenously
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 7-26.
30
Houston, J. F., Lin, C., Lin, P., & Ma, Y. (2010). Creditor rights, information sharing, and
bank risk taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 96 (3), 485-512.
Ingley, C., & van der Walt, N. (2008). Risk management and board effectiveness.
International Studies of Management and Organization, 38(3), 43-70.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives.
The Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264.
Jin, L. (2002). CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives. Journal of Financial
Economics, 66(1), 29-63.
Kim, K.-H., & Buchanan, R. (2008). CEO Duality Leadership and Firm Risk-Taking
Propensity. Journal of Applied Business Research, 24(1), 27-41.
Kirkpatrick, G. (2009). Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis. OECD
Journal: Financial Market Trends, 1, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fmt
-v2009-art3-en.
Klein, A., (2002). Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings
Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400.
Kogan, N., & Wallach, M. A. (1964). Risk taking: A study in cognition and personality: New
York: Holt.
Konishi, M., and Yasuda, Y. (2004). Factors affecting bank risk taking: Evidence from Japan.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 28(1), 215-232.
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2009). Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal of
Financial Economics, 93(2), 259-275.
Levine, R. (2004). The corporate governance of banks: a concise discussion of concepts and
evidence. Working Paper, world Bank Policy Research
Lewellyn, K. B., & Muller-Kahle, M. I. (2012). CEO Power and Risk Taking: Evidence from
the Subprime Lending Industry. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
20(3), 289-307.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal of
Financial Economics 87(2), 308-328.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance.
Business Lawyer 48, 59-77.
Macey, J. R., & O'Hara, M. (2003). The Corporate Governance of Banks. FRBNY Economic
Policy Review, 91-107.
Magnan, M., & Markarian, G. (2011). Accounting, Governance and the Crisis: Is Risk the
Missing Link? European Accounting Review, 20(2), 215-231.
McNulty, T., Florackis, C., & Ormrod, P. (2013). Boards of Directors and Financial Risk
during the Credit Crisis. Corporate Governance (Oxford), 21(1), 58-78.
Minton, B. A., Taillard, J. P., & Williamson, R. (2014). Financial Expertise of the Board,
Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49(2), 351-380.
Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni, M. (1969). The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 12(2), 125-135.
Nakano, M., & Nguyen, P. (2012). Board Size and Corporate Risk Taking: Further Evidence
from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(4), 369-387.
Nam, S. W. (2004). Corporate Governance of Banks: Review of Issues. SSRN eLibrary.
Nguyen, P. 2011. Corporate governance and risk-taking: Evidence from Japanese firms.
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 19(3), 278-297.
31
Ntim, C.G., Lindop, S. & Thomas, D.A. (2013). Corporate governance and risk reporting in
South Africa: A study of corporate risk disclosures in the pre- and post-2007/2008
global financial crisis periods. International Review of Financial Analysis, 30, 363-
383.
Ozkan, A., & Ozkan, N. (2004). Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK
companies. Journal of Banking & Finance, 28(9), 2103-2134.
Ozkan, N. (2007). Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An
empirical investigation of UK companies. Journal of Multinational Financial
Management, 17(5), 349-364.
Pathan, S. (2009). Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking &
Finance 33(7), 1340-1350.
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board composition from a strategic contingency
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29(4), 411-438.
Prowse, S. (1997). Corporate control in commercial banks. Journal of Financial Research 20
(4):509.
Raheja, C. G. (2005). Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate
Boards. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 40(2), 283-306.
Roodman, D., 2006. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in
Stata. Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 103.
Roy, A. D. (1952). Safety First and the Holding of Assets. Econometrica, 20 (3), 431-449.
Sah, R. K., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986). The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and
Polyarchies. American Economic Review, 76(4), 716-727.
Sah, R. K., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1991). The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus
Decentralized Organizations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1), 289-295.
Sepe, S. M. (2012). Regulating risk and governance in banks: a contractarian perspective.
Emory Law Journal, 62(2), 327-406.
Shumway, T. (2001). Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model.
The Journal of Business, 74(1), 101-124.
Smith, C., & Jensen, M. (2000). Stockholder, manager, and creditor interests: applications of
agency theory. SSRN eLibrary.
Srivastav, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016). Corporate Governance and Banks Risk-taking.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 334-345.
Staikouras, P., Staikouras, C., & Agoraki, M.-E. (2007). The effect of board size and
composition on European bank performance. European Journal of Law and
Economics, 23(1), 1-27.
Tao, N. B., & Hutchinson, M. (2013). Corporate governance and risk management: The role
of risk management and compensation committees. Journal of Contemporary
Accounting & Economics, 9(1), 83-99.
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). UK Corporate Governance Code. Financial Services
Authority, London, UK.
Vyas, D. (2011). The Timeliness of Accounting Write-Downs by U.S. Financial Institutions
During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(3),
823-860.
Wang, C.-J. (2012). Board size and firm risk-taking. Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, 38(4), 519-542.
Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and the dynamics of
internal corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics 105(3), 581-606
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial
Risk Taking. The Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133-153.
32
Yermack , D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors.
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2),185-211.
